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LEGAL IDEALS AND MORAL OBLIGATIONS: A COMMENT
ON SIMON
DAVID LUBAN*
Since I began to work on legal ethics seventeen years ago, I
have admired and more than occasionally appropriated Bill
Simon's work. Before assuming the commentator's customary
role as critic, I want to begin by placing Simon's paper1 in the
larger context of the extraordinary body of work he has produced
since he published The Ideology of Advocacy in 1978.2 I then
turn to some points of difference between us.
I
One should read Simon's writings on legal ethics side-by-side
with his papers on the welfare system.' I understand both bodies of work to be elaborate arguments about the constructive use
of professional power. Broadly speaking, Simon writes from the
perspective of critical legal theory,4 which often exhibits a reflexive mistrust of power hierarchies.5 Simon's posture, however, is that of a sympathetic critic of the critics. He argues that
there is actually no such-thing as a nonhierarchical relationship
between professionals and clients for us to aim at even as an

* Morton and Sophia Macht Professor of Law, University of Maryland; Research
Scholar, Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy. BA., University of Chicago, 1970;
Ph.D., Yale, 1974.
1. William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law? 38 WM. & MARY L. REV.
217 (1996).
2. William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29.
3. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights,
44 MD. L. REV. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Simon, Welfare Rights]; William H. Simon,
Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983)
[hereinafter Simon, Welfare System].
4. See, e.g., Simon, Welfare System, supra note 3, at 1232-33.
5. See id.; Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics, and the
Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 199, 208-11 (1984).
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ideal, and that efforts to curb the power of professionals often
backfire. For example, welfare-rights lawyers who were suspicious of paternalistic social workers delivered welfare clients
from the social workers' hands into the considerably less sympathetic hands of clerks and bureaucrats.6 In a 1980 paper, Simon
argued that progressive lawyers and clinicians who tried to
bridge the power-gulf between lawyers and clients by teaching
lawyers to focus on their clients' feelings simply substituted a
formalism of feeling for a formalism of doctrine-in both cases,
at the expense of a genuinely political vision of legal practice.7
Elsewhere, Simon has argued that theorists who criticize lawyer
paternalism in the name of client autonomy overlook the fact
that it is the lawyer who often constructs client autonomy, no
matter how hard the lawyer tries not to influence the client's
choices.8 More recently, Simon has criticized progressive lawyers who insist on giving deference to client groups? In his
view, these theorists overlook the "Dark Secret of Progressive
Lawyering... that effective lawyers cannot avoid making judgments in terms of their own values and influencing their clients
to adopt those judgments." °
It is within this context that we should read The Ideology of
Advocacy," Ethical Discretion in Lawyering,"2 The Ethics of
Criminal Defense, 3 and the present paper. In much the same
way that poverty lawyers sometimes make a fetish of transfer-

6. See Simon, Welfare System, supra note 3, at 1214-16 (summarizing the shift of
responsibilities from professional social workers to clerical workers in the administration of Aid to Families with Dependent Children). The lawyers also constructed a
less-subtle jurisprudence of welfare rights than that developed by social workers in
the 1930s and 1940s. See Simon, Welfare Rights, supra note 3, at 1.
7. See William H. Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a-New Legal Formalism,
32 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1980).
8. William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50
MD. L. REV. 213, 217 (1991).
9. See William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment
on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1099 (1994).
10. Id. at 1102.
11. Simon, supra note 2.
12. William H. Simon, EthicalDiscretionin Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988).
13. William H. Simon, The Ethics of CriminalDefense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993).
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ring discretion from the lawyer to the subordinated client,'4 the
zealous advocacy model of mainstream legal ethics insists that
lawyers have no discretion to deviate from their clients' instructions except by resigning. The reasons behind both of these nodiscretion models, according to Simon, are almost invariably
formalistic. By this, Simon means that in place of a full-bodied
assessment of actions from an impersonal standpoint, the models schematically focus on a single set of interests-for example,
those of the criminal defendant-at the expense of the interests
of victims and the community at large.
Simon is skeptical of efforts to elevate private interests at the
expense of public norms and suspicious of arguments purporting
to show that the one-sided advancement of private interests is
really in the public interest. Viewed in this way, his ideas about
legal ethics fit together with his defense of market socialism in
the important paper Social-Republican Property.5 Simon believes that legal norms, like property, should be held in trust for
the beneficial enjoyment of the community. 6 Lawyers who argue that one-sided advocacy is in the public interest are like
entrepreneurs who argue that making them rich will benefit
everyone.
The opposite of these formalistic efforts to shackle professionals is the ideal of professional discretion that Simbn defends
throughout his work.'7 Simon insists that lawyers should shake
free of rigid, categorical rules and analyze each situation in
terms of the purposes underlying legal norms and institutions. 8 In this way, professional discretion can proceed unfettered without being standardless. 9
The following, then, are what I take to be the central themes
of Simon's work. The first central theme is a defense of what he
calls "the legal ideals of transcendence and universality."20 In

14. See Simon, supra note 9, at 1103-04.
15. William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335 (1991).
16. Id. at 1350-56.
17. See Simon, supra note 1, passim; Simon, supra note 2, at 130-44; Simon, supra note 8, at 224-25.
18. See Simon, supra note 1, at 223.
19. Id. at 247.
20. Simon, supra note 7, at 541.
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the present paper, Simon defends the purposes and ideals underlying legal norms against both positivism and moralism.." A
second central theme is a critique of rigid categorical rules
whose formalism undermines those legal ideals.22 Here he criticizes the commonly held idea that lawyers must categorically
obey the law. 3 And a third central theme is a defense of professional discretion in the service of those ideals.' Today, he promotes discretionary judgment in the form of nullification.'
II
Simon argues that lawyers have no obligation to obey the law
if the law is understood "in narrow Positivist terms[,]" 26 as hard-

and-fast rules that are literally understood. (The term "narrow"
in the expression "narrow Positivism" is not redundant, because
there is also such a thing as wide positivism, which includes in
the legality-conferring pedigree of a rule the broad, purposive
interpretive standards that Simon favors.) Having a good
positivist pedigree is insufficient to create a moral obligation.
I agree with this argument, and indeed I, too, have argued
that lawyers do not lie under an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law.27 In my view, we have an obligation to
obey a law only when (1) the legal requirement corresponds with
a moral requirement, in other words, when violating the legal
requirement would be malum in se; or else (2) when the law
establishes a fair and reasonable scheme of social cooperation.28
Even in the latter case, however, the obligation to do one's fair
share in a reasonable cooperative scheme does not establish a
categorical requirement to obey the law under all circumstances.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
acted
26.
27.
Prrr.
28.

Simon, supra note 1, at 220-27.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 218-20.
Id. at 225-27. Simon describes nullification as an "effort to alter or erase enlaw." Id.
Id. at 217.
See David Luban, Conscientious Lawyers for Conscientious Lawbreakers, 52 U.
L. REv. 793, 797-801 (1991).
Id. at 803.
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Other morally relevant concerns can override the obligation. 9
Simon and I agree that the reason lawyers do not have a
categorical obligation to obey the law is that no one has a categorical obligation to obey the law. 0 This runs contrary to a
common view that lawyers have a greater responsibility to abide
by the law than do citizens in general. As the ABA Model Code
puts it, "[tlo lawyers especially, respect for the law should be
more than a platitude."3 ' I draw the opposite conclusion, and I
expect that Simon would agree: because lawyers are often better
positioned than nonlawyers to realize the unfairness or unreasonableness of a law, lawyers often should be among the first to
violate or nullify it, or to counsel others that it is acceptable to
violate or nullify it.
Both the ABA's Model Code and Model Rules prohibit lawyers
from counseling or assisting clients in illegal conduct, regardless
of whether the illegal conduct is undertaken for reasons of conscience." Reading these prohibitions in conjunction with both
codes' prohibitions against violating the codes33 yields the result that lawyers who participate in nullification subject themselves to professional discipline. In my view, we should reinterpret or redraft these rules to permit lawyers to engage in conscientious disobedience without jeopardizing their licenses.m

29. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 33, 44 (1988).
30. Compare Simon, supra note 1, at 235-36 (describing the societal benefits derived from conscientious disobedience of the law) with LUBAN, supra note 29, at 44
(arguing that no person has a categorical duty to obey the law).
31. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (1983) (emphasis added).
32. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (d) (1994) (prohibiting
attorneys from counseling or assisting clients to break the law); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DR 7-102(A)(7) (1994).
33. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(a) (prohibiting attorneys
from violating rules of professional conduct); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILiTY DR 1-102(A)(1) (prohibiting attorneys from violating Disciplinary Rules).
34. For example, one might add the following italicized language to Model Rule
1.2(d):
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, unless the conduct
is undertaken for reasons of conscience, without intended pecuniary gain
to the client or lawyer, and with no attempt by either lawyer or client to
conceal the unlawful conduct; but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel
or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity,
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III

I have been speaking about a moral obligation to obey the law
and its possible conflicts with other moral obligations. Simon,
however, wishes to frame the issue differently. He analyzes the
obligation to obey the law, when it exists, as the realization of
the legal ideals of order, fairness, and democracy; he regards the
other values that can conflict with these as legal values; he
argues that nullification is a legal act rather than primarily an
act of conscience." Where others see conflicts between law and
morality, Simon sees "intralegal"6 or "law-law" 7 conflicts. He
seems to consider this an important difference between his
3 " I would
views and those of other writers, including myself.
now like to explore the difference.
Simon counterposes to positivism a view of law that he calls
"Substantivism"--what most writers call "natural law," though
that term's "exotic and metaphysical" connotations displease
him.3" It seems from the tenor of his argument, as well as from
his characterization of his opponents as "Positivists," that
Simon's own sympathies lie with the Substantivists.40 True,
Simon claims that "neither Positivism nor Substantivism, in
their uncompromising, full-strength versions, are plausible."4
However, his own efforts to translate the moral conflicts facing
lawyers into legal conflicts make sense only under a
Substantivist conception of law, according to which legal norms
are "expressions of more general principles that are indissolubly

scope, meaning, or application of the law.
In parallel fashion, one might add the following italicized language to Model Rule
8.4(a):
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate or attempt to
violate the rules of professional conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to. do so, or do so through the acts of another unless the violation
is undertaken for reasons of conscience, without intended pecuniary gain
to the lawyer, and with no attempt by the lawyer to conceal the violation.
35. Simon, supra note 1, at 232-33.
36. Id. at 245.
37. Id. at 246.
38. See id. at 245-47.
39. Id. at 223.
40. Id. at 253.
41. Id. at 227.
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legal and moral."4 2 To the extent that Substantivism fails,
Simon's law-law characterization of professional conflicts fails.4"
For purposes of analyzing the law-law idea, I therefore treat
Simon as a Substantivist.
According to Simon, "[tlo a radical Substantivist there is no
distinction between legal and nonlegal norms,"" and I suggest
that this Substantivist idea explains in part why Simon wants
to treat all norms as legal norms. But is it true that no distinction exists between legal and nonlegal norms?
On some constructions of the issue, it clearly is not true. It is
not true that every moral norm is also a legal requirement. There
are moral norms but no legal norms against hypocrisy, ingratitude, self-pity, and bragging.4 5 Conversely, it is likewise not true
that every legal norm must also be a moral norm-otherwise the
category of mala prohibitawould be empty.46
Can an action be legally required but morally forbidden or,
alternatively, legally forbidden but morally praiseworthy? I
think that Simon's answer is "no," and that this is the sense in
which he finds no distinction between legal and nonlegal norms.
My basis for this opinion is Simon's claim that "[a]ny argument
for disobedience to a particular [legal] command would also be
an argument that the command was an incorrect interpretation
of the law." In particular, the law cannot command us to do

42. Id. at 223. Simon himself acknowledges that some problems can be character-

ized as law-law conflicts only on a natural law conception. See Simon, supra note
12, at 1115-16 (arguing that "a natural law lawyer" would be able to treat a conflict
between a clear statutory expression and a duty of justice as a conflict among legal
values rather than a conflict between law and justice).
43. At one point, Simon acknowledges this: "The point ... at which the lawyer stops
thinking of the conflict as intralegal depends on the balance of Positivist and Substantive commitments in his working philosophy." Simon, supra note 1, at 245.
44. Id. at 226-27.
45. Simon's own arguments about discretion recognize that some acts may be

morally wrong but legally permitted; for example, all-white Southern juries of 50
years ago often nullified antilynching laws. See id. at 225. More generally, discretion

logically implies that abuse of discretion is possible-and abuse of discretion consists
of lawfully doing what is morally forbidden. See id. at 224.

46. Simon describes a situation in which a statute prohibits a citizen from parking
at a metered space, paying for the maximum time, and then putting more coins in

the meter when the time expires. Id. at 243. Such behavior violates a legal norm
but no moral norm. Id.

47. Id. at 227.
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what is morally forbidden, nor forbid us from doing what is
morally praiseworthy. If the law seems to command the forbidden or forbid the praiseworthy, we have misinterpreted the law.
Linguists and logicians sometimes refer to the "principle of
charity," which says that if your translation of a foreigner's
statement would imply that the foreigner has crazy beliefs, then
you should assume that the fault lies with your translation.48
Simon, in effect, applies the principle of charity to legal interpretation: if an interpretation of the law brings legal norms into
conflict with morality, then the fault lies with the interpretation.49 This amounts to a transcendental argument that the law
cannot be morally crazy for, if it is, it's not the law.50 Simon, of
course, is not alone in applying the principle of charity to legal
interpretation. As I understand it, that is precisely what Ronald
Dworkin is up to when he argues that legal interpretation consists in making the law the best that it can be.5 '
The device that Simon uses to secure his argument is nullification. Simon interprets this device broadly to encompass not
only jury nullification but also conscientious disobedience of the
law and even widespread noncompliance.52 Importantly, Simon
insists that "[tihe power to nullify is

. .

. a duty to interpret

what the law requires."" In other words, nullification is our
device for putting the principle of charity into practice-our way
of making the law the best that it can be by ignoring it when it
seems to be worse.
I have my doubts about this way of thinking about nullification. Consider that Dworkin's formula requires us to make the
law the best that it can be: our interpretation must fit the available legal materials.' If the fit is too implausible, then our act
of nullification, however justified it may be, is not an interpreta-

48. See, e.g., DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION xvii,
196-97 (1984); W.V.O. QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 59 n.2 (1960).
49. See Simon, supra note 1, at 226-27.
50. See id.
51. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 53-54 (1986).
52. Simon terms such actions "casual nullification." Simon, supra note 1, at 233.
53. Id. at 226.
54. Ronald Dworkin argues this explicitly in "Natural"Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA.
L. REV. 165, 169-70 (1982).
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tion of the law. This conclusion corresponds with our actual way
of speaking about the law. To take one of Simon's examples,
drivers may nullify the fifty-five miles per hour speed limit by
running at a comfortable speed, but few drivers would deny that
the speed limit is fifty-five miles per hour, nor would they argue
that the posted limit means "drive at a comfortable speed."5 5
This point is important because it implies that the norms to
which we speeders appeal to justify nullifying the speed limit
are not legal norms, and that the conflict lies between law and
something that is not law-our sense of safety or reasonableness, perhaps.
As I understand it, nullification requires the following: first, a
categorical legal rule requiring (or forbidding) an action; second,
the ability of an actor to avoid (or perform) the action with impunity, either (a) because the actor has been granted unreviewable discretion over the action, or (b) because the rule is not
enforced against the actor; third, a principled reason for the
actor to disobey the rule.
Simon .apparently concludes from the fact that the actor has
been granted unreviewable discretion, or that the rule is not
enforced, that the legal system has incorporated whatever principle leads the actor to disobey the rule.56 I disagree. Other reasons can exist for granting people unreviewable discretion-for
example, that review must stop somewhere-or for deciding not
to enforce a rule-for example, that enforcement is too expensive
or harsh. Neither of these reasons implies that the law has incorporatedthe actor's principle, only that the law tolerates it.
Now there is one sense, emphasized by the Realists, in which
any moral principle you choose "belongs" to the law-namely,
that legal principles can be found to justify any morally plausible proposition. Karl Llewellyn, for example, showed in a famous
article that for every canon of statutory construction there is an
equal and opposite canon;" in this respect, the canons and legal materials more generally are like proverbs. Haste makes
55. See Simon, supra note 1, at 234.
56. See id. at 233-34.
57. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06
(1950).
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waste, but a stitch in time saves nine; too many cooks spoil the
broth, but the more the merrier. But this realist observation, I
take it, is an uninteresting version of the law-law thesis: a body
of principles that explains everything explains nothing.
IV
In the final section of his paper, Simon argues that "[t]here
is... a strong affinity between Positivism and those legal
ethicists who portray the core dilemmas of practice as matters of
role morality. .. ."" As one of the ethicists who portrays the
core dilemmas of practice as conflicts between role morality and
common morality, I want to disagree. Simon's argument would
be right if role morality meant nothing more than whatever the
rules of ethics command lawyers to do. That is not how I understand role morality, however.
Consider the dilemma facing a lawyer whose client has told
her in confidence that an innocent person has been imprisoned
for the client's crime. The moral issue of whether to reveal the
confidence would exist regardless of what the rule of confidentiality said; it would exist even if there were no rules of legal
ethics. It is a dilemma created by the lawyer's role morality
understood in Substantivist terms. A lawyer's role-obligations
are the natural law of lawyering:5 9 those norms that are functionally necessary for performing the lawyer's role, which in
turn is defined by social institutions such as the adversary system.6" Keeping client confidences is one of those role-obligations, and that creates the dilemma. Positivism has nothing to
do with it, because, at bottom, the dilemma is not a conflict
between law and morality at all; it is a conflict within morality.
It will have likely occurred to you by this time that I am
counterposing a morality-morality description of professional
ethics to Simon's law-law description. You may also suspect that
since Simon subsumes morality under law, and I dissolve law
into morality, there is really little more than a verbal difference

58. Simon, supra note 1, at 243.
59. I take this term from David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment:
Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 43 (1995).
60. See LUBAN, supra note 29 at 140.
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between us. I suspect the same. Simon offers two reasons for
preferring the law-law~picture to either the morality-morality or
the law-versus-morality pictures of ethical conflict. I wish to
conclude by discussing these reasons.
Simon prefers the law-law picture because it "suggests that
the matter is susceptible to resolution in terms of the analytical
methods and sources of legal argument," which, loose as they
are, "are typically thought more structured and grounded than
popular moral discourse."6 ' Perhaps this is what legal analysis
is typically thought to be; however, I am more inclined to agree
with Richard Posner about what legal analysis is. The legal analyst, Posner reminds us, deals with "texts-primarily judicial
opinions, statutes, and miscellaneous rules and regulations-written by judges, law clerks, politicians, lobbyists, and
civil servants. To these essentially, and perhaps increasingly,
mediocre texts he applies analytical tools of no great power ...."" Now, it may be that even the unpowerful analysis of
mediocre texts enjoys a comparative advantage over popular
moral discourse. If so, I suspect that is only because popular
moral discourse is typically shorter and less sustained than legal
argument. For a fair test, we should compare a good legal analysis of an issue with a comparably good and comparably long
essay, sermon, journalistic think-piece, or short story dealing
with the same issue. I suspect that we will not find more illumination in the legal analysis.
A more significant point is Simon's second argument, that the
law-law picture of an ethical dilemma "suggests that the profession or some subgroup of it might have some collective responsibility for its resolution," whereas "[m]oral considerations ... are
presumptively a matter for the individual decision maker to
resolve privately more or less on her own."' Here, I think that
Simon has mistaken the nature of moral deliberation, a point
that I have learned from Thomas Shaffer." Shaffer insists that,

61. Simon, supra note 1, at 246-47.
62. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 90-91 (1995).
63. Simon, supra note 1, at 247.
64. THoDuS L. SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND TH:Em
COMiUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1991); see David Luban, The Legal
Ethics of Radical Communitarianism, 60 TENN. L. REV. 589 (1993) (book review).
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at bottom, moral deliberation takes place within communities-communities that can include friends and families, religious congregations, coworkers, or professional groups.65
Simon's reminders about the importance of individual professional discretion need coupling with reminders about the importance of humility about our own powers of judgment-powers
that are likely to fail us unless we talk matters over with other
people when confusion besets us.
My own sense is that the intraprofessional discourse about
legal ethics is often of a lower quality thandiscussions with
nonlawyers, precisely because the law gets in the way. Let me
illustrate with an example. A gay couple approached two New
Jersey lawyers with a proposed change in the couple's wills.66
One was ill with AIDS, the other was apparently healthy, and
the clients explained that they had made a suicide pact.6 The
lawyers were understandably dismayed and told the clients that
they needed to think about whether they could accept the assignment to redraft the wills. The lawyers logged onto a legal
ethics Internet discussion group, and the discussion quickly
turned to issues such as these:' Although suicide is not unlawful in New Jersey, assisting suicide is. Would the partner who
turned the ignition key of the death-car be assisting suicide? 9
If so, would the lawyers be running afoul of Rule 1.2(d)?7" Did
New Jersey's mandatory-disclosure confidentiality rule require
them to reveal the suicide pact to the authorities?7' Conspicuously absent from the discussion were any of the larger issues
about suicide and assisted suicide generally, or any worry that
the ill companion may have guilt-tripped the healthy partner

65. SHAFFER & SHAFFER, supra note 64, at 25-28.
66. See Richard Pliskin, The Ethics of Suicide, N.J. L.J., June 20, 1994, at 1, 36.
67. Id. at 36.
68. Id.
69. Id. The two men planned to kill themselves by carbon monoxide poisoning in
their car. Id.
70. N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1995) (prohibiting a lawyer
from assisting a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct).
71. N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1995) (requiring a lawyer to disclose information necessary to prevent a client from committing a criminal
act which the lawyer believes may result in death or substantial bodily harm).
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into suicide."
Simon might object that the real problem was precisely the
one he has highlighted for us, namely how impoverished legal
discourse is when it treats rules as Positivistic conversationstoppers.73 Surely the larger issues are part of the legal discourse. In one sense, he is clearly right. Simon himself, however,
has acknowledged that most lawyers' working philosophies include a healthy dollop of Positivism,7 4 whereas popular culture
is impatient with legalism and focuses on substance. 5 Focusing
on substance is not always a virtue, but in cases such as the
double suicide, I suspect that the lawyers would have received
better advice from almost any group of their friends than they
received from their professional peers.

72. Pliskin, supra note 66, at 36.
73. See Simon, supra note 1, at 220-21.
74. Id. at 228.
75. See generally id. at 236-39 (discussing popular culture film depictions of law
and lawyers).

